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I. Introduction: Uber as sharing economy
Uber needs no introductions. It is one of  the most famous electronic platforms 
to have been created in the last decade and it is said to be destined to change not 
only the way we move in urban areas but, above all, the way we live. Founded in 
2009, with headquarters in San Francisco, California, Uber was initially a ride-hailing 
service. Currently, it offers peer-to-peer ridesharing, taxicab hailing, food delivery, 
bicycle-sharing, among other services. At the moment of  the writing of  this article, the 
company has operations in 785 metropolitan areas worldwide1 and it is estimated that 
it has 100 million users worldwide. On 8th Dec. 2018, Uber filed for an initial public 
offering and it was announced that it could be valued at more than 100 billion US 
dollars.2
Even if  it can be said that the emergence of  new technologies always carries with 
it controversy and debate, Uber seems to constitute a unique case. Often referred to as a 
“disruptive innovator”,3 it has invaded language, “uberizing” referring to a revolutionary 
way of  not only doing business, but more broadly, of  organizing communities. The 
meaning of  the new word is twofold as it reflects both, the hesitations and critiques 
that Uber has given rise to and the hopes and expectations it brings with it. This new 
reality challenges our preconceptions and puts into question well-known structures 
and concepts from the past. In a short article titled “Uber somos todos”,4 Luz Rodríguez 
argues that, in certain sense, we all are Uber. We all are Uber inasmuch as we act as 
consumers, who sooner or later, reach out to electronic platforms to have access to 
certain services (e.g., Cabify, Airbnb, Deliveroo). But above all, we are Uber because the 
way these platforms work is destined to affect the labour market so intensively that we 
all end up being affected as employees, employers and members of  the community as 
a whole.
From an economic standpoint, Uber is often mentioned as the most prominent 
example of  the so-called “sharing economy”. Although there is no consensus on the 
exact scope of  this concept, the advent of  digital platforms has been welcomed as 
an alternative to consumerism and the traditional model of  private and individual 
ownership.5 Through those platforms “individuals gained the opportunity to re-design the way 
in which they consume, own, and work. Instead of  enabling companies to sell their goods and services, 
those platforms allowed peers to benefit from joint access to products and skills. There, individuals 
could share, barter, lend, rent, gift, and swap resources that would otherwise be underutilised”.6 The 
European Economic and Social Committee has noted that collaborative or participatory 
consumption practices can apply virtually to any aspect of  daily life, “such as:
– mobility (car-sharing, the rental and shared use of  vehicles, including taxis, bicycles and 
parking places, and carpooling, which means filling empty car seats with other passengers going 
in the same direction), 




3 See e.g., Scott Anthony, “Disruptive innovation: what’s holding Uber Back,” Harvard Business Review 
(June 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/06/whats-holding-uber-back.
4 Luz Rodriguez, “Uber Somos Todos”, InfoLibre, 06.03.2017, https://www.infolibre.es/noticias/
luces_rojas/2017/03/05/uber_somos_todos_61998_1121.html.
5 See Margherita Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “Uber: A New Challenge for Regulation and 
Competition Law?,” Market and Competition Law Review, vol. 1, issue 2 (2017): 48.
6 Ibidem, 48-49.
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– accommodation and areas for growing food (rental of  rooms, shared housing, and urban and 
rural allotments),
– business (co-working or shared office space), 
– communications (mobile platforms where users can buy and sell goods and services to people 
living in the same community), 
– work (micro-tasks, hiring people for specific jobs, or “handymen”, where the best bidder is given 
tasks ranging from hanging pictures to assembling items of  furniture), 
– culture (bookcrossing and book bartering, and promoting cultural exchanges among young 
people from different countries), 
– education (digital communities for learning languages), 
– time and skills (time banks), 
– leisure (sharing digitised content), 
– finance (loans between individuals, direct loans from individuals to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, crowdfunding or collective financing, crowdfunding for crowdbenefits), 
– tourism (dining experiences in private homes), and peer-to-peer food swapping, 
– art and also markets for bartering and donating clothing and items for children, repair and 
recycling of  objects; many other initiatives could be mentioned, but a comprehensive study of  these 
is not the purpose of  this opinion,
– promoting the use of  renewable energies, where possible sharing energy surpluses through smart 
networks”.7
In this context, scholars have considered that the sharing economy may consist 
basically of  two different business models. In the first model, market players offer 
goods or services through the internet, mobile apps, or both. In the second, business 
entities create a web platform where owners of  goods or performers of  services meet 
and conclude sharing agreements with people who want to access such goods or 
services.8 Whereas the first model involves two parties and one agreement between 
them, the second is based on a tripartite relationship involving the conclusion of  
several agreements. In this sense, Uberpop falls in the latter business model of  the 
sharing economy.
The European Commission has also acknowledged the rapid emergence of  a 
variety of  collaborative economy business models across Europe, which change the 
way services are traditionally provided and consumed. In its “European Agenda for 
the Collaborative Economy”,9 the Commission adopted a very broad definition of  
the term, considering that “collaborative economy” includes “business models where 
7 Opinion of  the European Economic and Social Committee on “Collaborative or participatory 
consumption, a sustainability model for the 21st century”, Brussels, 21 January 2014, para. 4.10. In its 
Opinion, the EESC further noted that “collaborative or participatory consumption (…) represents an innovative 
complement to a production economy in the form of  a use-based economy offering economic, social and environmental 
benefits. It also offers a way out of  the economic and financial crisis, by enabling people to exchange things for others that 
they need (…). Given the complexity and importance of  the emergence of  collaborative or participatory consumption, the 
relevant institutions need, on the basis of  the necessary studies, to regulate the practices carried out within these forms of  
consumption, in order to establish the rights and responsibilities of  all the stakeholders involved. Firstly, collaborative or 
participatory consumption can meet social needs in situations where there is no commercial interest and, secondly, it can 
help, as a for-profit activity, to create jobs, while complying with the rules on taxation, safety, liability, consumer protection 
and other essential rules”. See paras. 1.3. and 1.4. See also European Parliament – Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies – Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies – Research for Tran Committee 
– Tourism and the Sharing Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU 2015.
8 See Alessio di Amato, “Uber and the Sharing Economy,” The Italian Law Journal, vol. 2, No. 1 (2016): 185.
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, “The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions: A European Agenda for the 
Collaborative Economy”, COM(2016) 356 final, Brussels, 2.6.2016.
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activities are facilitated by online platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary use of  
goods or services often provided by private individuals”.10 According to the Commission, this 
collaborative economy involves three categories of  actors: (i) service providers who 
share assets, resources, time and skills, and that can be private individuals offering 
services on an occasional basis or professional service providers; (ii) users of  these 
services; and (iii) collaborative economy platforms that connect providers with users 
and facilitate transactions between them, also ensuring the quality of  these transactions 
(e.g., through after-sale services, insurance services, etc). As a rule, collaborative 
economy transactions do not involve a change of  ownership and can be carried out for 
profit or not for profit. 
It is unclear, however, if  Uber fits perfectly the new category. As is well-known, 
Uber cannot be considered merely a mobile application hosting several transactions 
occurring between consumers and drivers. The company supplies the electronic 
payment system, fixes the price and guarantees the price fixing system, organizes the 
listings, charges a fee for each transaction and issues quality and safety standards for 
vehicles and drivers. Scholars have, thus, argued that “Uber falls somewhere along a spectrum 
between purely hosting platforms and direct service providers”.11
The difficulty in finding the right fit for Uber has also been felt at the juridical 
level, lawyers struggling to find the adequate legal answers to address the issues raised by 
Uber’s business model. The company’s strategy of  entering the market first and dealing 
with legal compliance issues later, has led to the multiplication of  lawsuits around the 
world pertaining to very different areas of  the law – a phenomenon suggestively referred 
to as the “Ubergate”.12 Indeed, currently, ongoing legal cases involving Uber extend to 
the fields of  (i) Commercial law (with taxi drivers accusing Uber of  unfair competition 
practices); (ii) Labour law (with Uber drivers claiming for labor law protection); (iii) 
Administrative law (having Uber been refused licensing in certain cities due to public 
safety concerns); (iv) Regulation (the difficulties in establishing an adequate regulatory 
framework for the transport activities); (v) Competition law (from the discussion of  
the Uber-Grab merger in Malaysia13 to the charges against Uber and Uber drivers 
of  colluding with the objective of  influencing prices);14 (vi) Tax law (mostly on VAT 
issues); (vii) Company law (with alleged practices of  mismanagement); (viii) Intellectual 
Property (e.g., the Waymo case),15 and (ix) Criminal law (the cases involving sexual 
misconduct against employees). It is, thus, not surprising that this complex new reality 
has, at a certain point, reached the European Union Courts as well. 
II. Uber and competition law: information society or transport 
services?
Most of  the lawsuits brought against Uber involve the allegation of  unfair 
10 See “European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy”, 3.
11 Margherita Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “Uber: A New Challenge for Regulation and 
Competition Law?”, 50.
12 Alessio di Amato, “Uber and the Sharing Economy”, 179.
13 See https://www.umlawreview.com/lex-in-breve/relevance-of-competition-law-on-the-uber-grab-
merger. 
14 See Spencer Meyer v Travis Kalanick, 15 Civ 9796, 2016 US Dist. See Julian Nowag, “The Uber Cartel? 
Uber between Labour and Competition Law”, Lund Student Law Review, WP 1/2016, 5. 
15 See http://fortune.com/2018/02/05/waymo-v-uber-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-high-stakes-
self-driving-tech-trial/.
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commercial practices because the company does not meet the regulatory requirements 
applicable to taxi operators. As someone has put it, it is argued that Uber “does not pay 
taxes or licensing fees; it endangers passengers; its drivers are untrained, unlicensed and uninsured or 
underinsured; passengers are not covered by insurance and in general, the company breaks the law”.16
As a rule, national courts have found Uber in breach of  domestic laws on unfair 
competition. Quite surprisingly, with minor exceptions, the issue of  the exact legal 
qualification of  Uber services has not been explored.17 It is undisputable, however, 
that in order to determine which rules should apply to Uber, it is necessary to first 
adjudicate on a question of  legal qualification, i.e. to determine the exact nature of  the 
services rendered by Uber. In particular, to discern whether Uber’s activities should be 
deemed as “transport services” or “information society services”. 
In this respect, Uber’s position is clear. The company has widely argued that it 
is merely an electronic platform and it does not provide any transport service. The 
application works in such a way as to put into contact potential drivers and potential 
passengers in whose relationships Uber does not participate or interfere in. Therefore, 
Uber is not in competition with taxi drivers or radio taxi services as it acts in a completely 
different market.
Due to the complexity of  the issue and the lack of  substantial guidance in 
this respect, some national courts have decided to address the Court of  Justice of  
the European Union (CJEU). This was the case of  the Nederlandstalige rechtbank van 
koophandel Brussel, in December 2015, of  the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lille, in July 
2016, and of  the German Bundesgerichtshof, in September 2017.18 
Before them, in August 2015, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil No. 3, of  Barcelona, 
sent the first request to the CJEU regarding the rules to be applied to Uber.19 The 
facts of  the case are well-known. In 2014, the Asociacion Profesional Elite Taxi brought 
an action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the activities of  Uber Systems Spain 
infringed the legislation in force amounting to misleading practices and acts of  unfair 
competition, and an order to cease its operations. The Barcelona court noted that 
although Uber Spain carried out its activity in Spain, that activity was linked to an 
international platform, thus justifying the assessment at EU level of  the actions of  the 
company. Furthermore, in order to determine whether the practices of  Uber Spain and 
16 Alessio di Amato, “Uber and the Sharing Economy”, 180.
17 By contrast, administrative courts in Berlin and Hamburg have rejected the qualification of  Uber 
as a mere intermediary, supporting a wide interpretation of  Uber as a carrier (VG Hamburg, 27 Aug 
2014, 5 E 3534/14 and OVG Hamburg, 24 Sep 2014; VG Berlin, 26 Sep 2014, VG 11 L 353.14 and 
OVG Berlin-Brandeburg, 10 Apr 2015, OVG 1 S 96.14). See Margherita Colangelo and Mariateresa 
Maggiolino, “Uber: A New Challenge for Regulation and Competition Law?”, 53-54. In March 2015, 
the Geneva Department of  Security and Economy banned Uber’s services in Geneva, stating that Uber 
qualifies as a taxi dispatching center under Geneva Taxi law and fails to comply with the therein stated 
rules. See Jessica Kim Sommer, “UBER in Switzerland,” Journal of  European Consumer and Market Law, 
vol. 3 (2015): 116-118.
18 The first of  these cases discloses the difficulties posed by this new reality. In Uber Belgium (Judgment 
Uber Belgium, 27 October 2016, case C-526/15), the national judge questioned the CJEU whether 
the principle of  proportionality (established in article 5 TEU and Article 52(1) of  the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights) in combination with Articles 15 to 17 of  the Charter and 49 and 56 TFEU should 
be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which the notion of  taxi service applies 
also to individual drivers that operate for free following requests by clients submitted through an 
electronic platform. The CJEU dismissed the case founding the reference inadmissible. It considered 
the question to be merely hypothetical – since the national legislation at stake did not seem to apply to 
services provided free of  charge, and to contain a contradictory description of  the activities at stake.
19 Judgment Asociacion Profesional Elite Taxi, 20 December 2017, case C-434/15.
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related companies could be classified as unfair practices in breach of  Spanish law, the 
court considered it necessary to ascertain whether or not Uber activities require prior 
administrative authorisation. The answer to that question would, however, depend 
on the classification of  Uber services, notably whether the latter must be regarded 
as transport services, information society services or a combination of  both. In this 
context, the national court decided to stay the proceedings and refer such question to 
the CJEU. 
The preliminary reference at stake concerned merely that point of  law. It was 
strictly a question on legal qualification, i.e. to know whether an intermediation service 
such as the one provided by Uber, the purpose of  which is to connect, by means of  
a smartphone application and for remuneration, non-professional drivers using their 
own vehicle with persons who wish to make urban journeys, is to be classified as a 
“service in the field of  transport” within the meaning of  Article 58(1) of  the Treaty 
on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU) or whether, on the contrary, 
said service is covered by Article 56 TFEU, and Directives 2006/12320 and 2000/31.21 
Nonetheless, as seen below, the consequences of  the correct legal classification go far 
beyond the application of  the Internal Market rules.
In his Opinion, Advocate-General (AG) Szpunar considered at the outset that 
to answer that question, it was irrelevant to discuss the precise meaning of  the term 
“collaborative economy”, and whether Uber could be considered an example of  a new way 
of  pursuing economic activities. In his view, what is relevant is that Uber cannot be 
considered a ride-sharing platform since, in reality, it provides a traditional transport 
service: “whether or not it is to be regarded as forming part of  a ‘collaborative economy’ is irrelevant 
to its classification under the law in force”.22
According to the AG, and contrary to the company’s allegations, Uber does not 
simply match supply to demand. It creates the supply itself, lays down rules concerning 
the essential characteristics of  the supply and organises the way it works.23 In his 
analysis, the AG drew attention to the following aspects of  the Uber business model:
a) Conditions applicable to the access and use of  the platform by drivers: there are numerous 
terms and conditions governing the taking up and pursuit of  the activity and also 
the conduct of  drivers when providing services;
b) Conditions applicable to vehicles: although varying from country and city, as a rule, 
they must be four or five-door passenger vehicles subject, at least, to an age 
limit, and must have passed a roadworthiness inspection and comply with the 
provisions on mandatory insurance;
c) Conditions applicable to drivers: who must, at least, be in possession of  a driving 
licence and have no criminal record;
d) Conditions applicable to the service and remuneration: drivers receiving a financial 
reward if  they accumulate a large number of  trips and Uber informing them 
of  where and when they can rely on there being a high volume of  trips and/or 
preferential fares;
e) Evaluation: as the application contains a rating function, enabling drivers to be 
20 Directive 2006/123 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 on ser-
vices in the internal market, OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36.
21 Directive 2000/31 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of  information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ 
2000 L 178, p. 1.
22 Para. 42 of  the AG’s Opinion.
23 Cf. para. 43 of  the AG’s Opinion.
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evaluated by passengers and vice versa, an average score falling below a given 
threshold resulting in exclusion from the platform, especially for drivers;
f) Price: set by Uber through an algorithm and calculated based on the distance and 
duration of  the trip, as recorded by the application by means of  GPS.24 
In this light, the AG concluded that Uber “exerts control over all the relevant aspects of  
an urban transport service”.25 The other aspects associated with the company’s activity are 
of  secondary importance from the perspective of  an average user of  urban transport 
services and do not influence his economic choices. It is Uber who “controls the economically 
significant aspects of  the transport service offered through its platform”.26 At the level of  legal 
qualification, this means that Uber’s activity “comprises a single supply of  transport”27 in a 
vehicle located and booked by means of  the smartphone application. According to the 
AG, this service is provided, from an economic standpoint, by Uber or on its behalf. 
This is also the way the service is presented to consumers and perceived by them, 
that when deciding to use Uber’s services, look for a transport service offering certain 
functions and a particular standard of  quality that are ultimately ensured by Uber itself.
In general, the Court of  Justice agreed with the AG. It made, however, some 
important considerations. First, the Court highlighted that an intermediation service 
consisting of  connecting a non-professional driver using his or her own vehicle with a 
person who wishes to make an urban journey is, in principle, a separate service from a 
transport service consisting of  the physical act of  transportation. The former service 
meets, in principle, the criteria for classification as an information society service. 
However, the Court considered that the service rendered by Uber is more than 
such a service. While providing an intermediation service, Uber simultaneously offers 
urban transport services, which it makes accessible in particular through software tools 
such as its application, and whose general operation it organises for the benefit of  
persons who wish to accept that offer in order to make an urban journey. In this ambit, 
the Court accepted the AG’s contention that Uber exercises decisive influence over the 
24 Cf. paras. 44-50 of  the AG’s Opinion.
25 Para. 51 of  the AG’s Opinion.
26 Ibidem. The AG distinguished Uber from intermediation platforms that allow for hotel reservations 
and flight purchases insofar as the latter operate independently from the hotels and airlines themselves: 
“[i]n contrast to the situation of  Uber’s drivers, both hotels and airlines are undertakings which function completely 
independently of  any intermediary platform and for which such platforms are simply one of  a number of  ways of  
marketing their services. Furthermore, it is the hotels and airlines – and not the booking platforms – that determine the 
conditions under which their services are provided, starting with prices. These undertakings also operate in accordance 
with the rules specific to their sector of  activity, so that booking platforms do not exert any prior control over access to 
the activity, as Uber does with its drivers” (para. 59). In Uber France (Judgment Uber France, 10 April 2018, 
case C-320/16), the same AG distinguished Uber from online advertising and franchising. The first, 
because it involves a service intended for users which consists in the communication of  information: 
“[i]t [is] directed, principally at least, not at people who [are] already patients of  the practitioner in question, but at 
the general public, in the hope of  attracting new patients. That sort of  communication may or may not result in the 
subsequent provision of  dental services (and, probably, in most cases it will not). Although the advertising [is] without 
question closely connected with the dental practice as such, it [has], by contrast, no real connection with the actual dental 
care provided to individual patients”. In the second case, because although “the franchisor may also exercise 
strict control over the activities of  its franchisees, to the extent that customers will perceive the franchisees as branches 
of  the franchisor rather than as independent undertakings … the role of  the franchisor is limited to providing services 
(such as trade mark licences, know-how, the supply of  equipment and the provision of  advice) to the franchisees. It will 
have no relationship with the users of  the final services, which will be provided solely by the franchisees. The services 
of  the franchisor are therefore independent of  the final services, even if, in such a context, the franchisor determines the 
conditions under which those services are provided” (see paras. 18-22 of  the AG’s Opinion).
27 Para. 53 of  the AG’s Opinion.
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conditions under which that service is provided, notably the maximum fare, the money 
flows, the quality of  the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct. 
Additionally, the Court highlighted two important dimensions associated with 
the provision of  Uber’s services based on the possible counterfactual scenario. In the 
Court’s view, without Uber’s application, Uber drivers would not be led to provide 
transport services, and persons wishing to make an urban journey would not use the 
services provided by those drivers. Thus, pursuant to the Court, the intermediation 
service provided by Uber is to be regarded as forming an integral part of  an overall 
service whose main component is a transport service.28 This classification is said to be 
consistent with prior case-law of  the Court, according to which the concept of  “services 
in the field of  transport” includes not only transport services in themselves but also any 
service inherently linked to any physical act of  moving persons or goods from one 
place to another by means of  transport.29
It has been argued that, from the Court’s perspective, there are three important 
elements that need to be taken into account in the legal classification at stake: (i) that 
the services are part of  the provision of  other services; (ii) the market creation aspect; 
and (iii) the decisive influence by the platform over the conditions under which that 
service is provided.30 The two latter aspects seem to complement the first which seems 
to be the decisive one. 
In any case, it should be noted that although not departing from the overall approach 
of  the AG, the Court’s conclusion is slightly different, insofar as it acknowledges that 
Uber provides a some-how two-sided service, an idea which hardly appears in the AG’s 
Opinion. According to the Luxembourg judges, there is, nonetheless, one dimension 
of  the service that is predominant with regard to the other, in such a way that in reality 
there is no mixed-service, but a single transport service. This approach echoes the so-
called “centre of  gravity” approach adopted by the Court in other fields of  EU law.31
In this light, the Court goes beyond the AG’s Opinion and concludes that Uber 
activities are covered not by Article 56 TFEU but by Article 58(1) TFEU. Freedom to 
provide services must, therefore, be achieved within the common transport policy [cf. 
Article 91(1) TFEU]. Given that in the current state of  EU law, there are no common 
rules governing non-public urban transport services and services that are inherently 
linked to those services, it is for the Member States to regulate the conditions under 
which intermediation services such as the one rendered by Uber are to be provided (in 
conformity with the general rules of  the TFEU). Consequently, the Court concluded 
that Uber type of  activities fall entirely under national competence.
In reaching that conclusion, the CJEU makes clear that the question in Elite 
Taxi was more than a mere legal qualification issue, going to the heart of  EU 
constitutional law. In deciding that Uber services fit into the common transport policy 
instead of  the freedom to provide services, the CJEU was, in reality, adjudicating on 
28 Para. 40 of  the judgment in Elite Taxi.
29 Para. 41 of  the judgment, mentioning to that effect, ruling in judgment Grupo Itevelesa and Others, 15 
October 2015, case C168/14, paras. 45 and 46, and Opinion 2/15 (Free Trade Agreement with Singapore), 
16 May 2017, para. 61. 
30 Lorna Woods, “Why Uber isn’t Appy: the ECJ defines the difference between transport and digital 
services”, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/12/why-uber-isnt-appy-ecj-defines.html.
31 E.g., case-law on the correct legal basis: “[i]f  examination of  a measure reveals that it pursues a twofold 
aim or that it has a twofold component and if  one of  those is identifiable as the main one, whereas the other is merely 
incidental, the measure must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main aim or component”. See 
e.g., judgment Commission/Council, 11 September 2003, case C-211/01, para. 39.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2019
62 Patrícia Fragoso Martins
a fundamental constitutional issue: the limits of  conferral and the exact scope of  the 
Union’s competences to act on the subject matter at stake. The debate on the correct 
classification of  services provided within the new collaborative economy became 
essentially a discussion on the principle governing the division of  competences between 
the Union and the States.
In addition, one should not underestimate the possible “slippery slope” effect of  
the CJEU’s judgment. The qualification of  Uber as a carriage may have an important 
impact at numerous levels, notably on issues of  taxation, Regulation and Competition 
law. Two examples can be referred to here in the field of  Competition law. 
On the one hand, in considering that Uber provides a transport service, the CJEU 
may have contributed to blur the waters with regards to the understanding of  the 
market for Competition law purposes. In this respect, authors have hesitated in the 
legal qualification of  Uber drivers as employees or independent contractors.32 In Elite 
Taxi, the AG disregarded the relevance of  this distinction since, in his view, a transport 
company may very well provide its services either through independent traders or 
through its employees.33 According to the AG, the fact that Uber is not the owner 
of  the vehicles is also irrelevant in this regard. Nonetheless, although it is far from 
obvious if  drivers can be considered as Uber subcontractors, these considerations lead 
us to revisit well-established concepts of  Competition law, such as the notion of  an 
undertaking or single economic entity.34 The issue of  knowing whether Uber and Uber 
drivers should be considered as separate economic entities is indeed problematic. The 
question arises subtly in the AG’s understanding according to whom Uber drivers do 
not pursue an activity that exists independently of  the platform. On the contrary, the 
activity exists solely because of  the platform, without which it would have no sense. 
However, contrary to what has been generally considered,35 the AG also made clear 
that the said relationship does not necessarily need to be perceived as a pure labour 
relationship. It seems that we are left in a grey area between labour relations, agency 
and other contractual arrangements, without being clear in which box to put Uber.
Moreover, this statement by the AG – which echoes the Court’s approach to 
the counterfactual, i.e., that in the absence of  Uber, neither the drivers nor the 
consumers would use the service – in combination with the idea that Uber provides 
a transport service, raises a second line of  questions dealing with a well-known topic 
of  Competition law: the definition of  the relevant market.36 If  one assumes that Uber 
provides a transport service, it should be possible to affirm that it is present in the same 
32 See e.g., Julian Nowag, “The Uber Cartel?”, 3 ss.
33 The issue has been widely discussed in US Courts. Uber lost a high profile case in California where 
it was found to be an employer due to the control exerted over the driver. While Uber lost a similar 
case in Florida and appealed both the California and Florida cases, it was successful in claiming that 
drivers are independent contractors in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Texas. See e.g., Julian Nowag, “The 
Uber Cartel?”, 3.
34 In the EU, Uber could potentially also argue that the arrangement with its drivers is based on an 
agency agreement, which are typically not subject to EU competition law due to the single economic 
entity doctrine. To that effect, Uber would need to establish that the drivers bear no or only an 
insignificant financial or commercial risk of  the transactions with the customers which would not be 
unproblematic. See Nowag, The Uber Cartel…, 7.
35 See for further discussion, Victoria Daskalova, “Regulating the new self-employed in the Uber 
economy: What Role for EU Competition Law?,” TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-028, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009120.
36 Commission notice on the definition of  the relevant market for the purposes of  Community 
competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5-13.
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market as taxi drivers/companies. However, this conclusion is not as straightforward 
as it may seem at first. Supporting this view, the Portuguese Competition Authority, 
in a report from 2016,37 considered that the carriage of  people in passenger vehicles 
comprises different types of  services, notably (i) taxi operators, (ii) car rentals with 
a driver and (iii) other transportation services usually associated with tourism.38 The 
Authority argued that electronic platforms represent relevant opportunities, notably at 
the level of  efficiencies and competition, mitigating possible market failures and other 
public policy concerns which have, until now, justified strong public regulation. It its 
report, the Authority seems to consider that Uber and taxis are present in the same 
relevant market, insofar as the emergence of  transport services based on electronic 
platforms made clear the consequences for competition of  the current strict regulatory 
framework, bringing to light the need to reform the sector. Notably, in the Authority’s 
words, the option to ban these new business models would have the potential of  not 
only depriving consumers of  the benefits of  innovation but also, of  the “competitive 
pressure”39 exercised on traditional taxi operators. 
Following this line of  reasoning, Italian courts have also decided that Uber 
cannot be qualified as a pure “match maker” insofar as UberPop allows drivers to sell 
transportation services to potential customers for profit. In this relationship, Uber does 
not play a secondary role because as drivers, they are not free to negotiate prices with 
passengers. The price is fixed by Uber’s algorithm that adjusts the tariffs according to 
supply and demand. Thus, Italian courts considered it to be; “undisputable that the market 
covered by Uber is exactly the same as that covered by taxis: the individual public transportation 
market where the customers’ needs can be satisfied equally by either a taxi booked by radio service or 
by private cars booked by UberPop”.40
By contrast, in the United States of  America, in a case decided by the Seventh 
Circuit Court on the legitimacy of  an ordinance of  Chicago City applying specific 
rules to transportation network providers, the court considered that the different rules 
applied to the latter were justified by the fact that their services are different and not 
interchangeable with taxi services41. According to the court, the major difference is 
that, in order to use Uber services, customers must sign up with a mobile application, 
thereby creating a contractual relationship with specific terms (such as fares, driver 
qualifications, insurance), so that the passenger knows these elements in advance. 
37 In July 2016, the Portuguese Competition Authority launched a public consultation paper on the 
issues of  competition and regulation in the sector of  transport in passenger vehicles, in Portugal. The 
consultation period ended in September, and on December 28th, the Authority issued its final report on 
the matter, where it identified the main regulatory constraints and presented a set of  recommendations 
to improve competition in the market. A few days earlier, the Government approved the draft bill, 
to be submitted to Parliament, establishing the new legal regime on Transport in Ordinary Vehicles 
through Electronic Platforms (Proposta de Lei n.º 50/XIII).
38 In Portugal, these activities are currently subject to significant regulatory constraints, mostly in what 
regards taxi services. According to the legislation in force, public transportation is subject to strict 
licensing requirements. The Competition Authority has identified restrictions to competition at the 
level of  market entry, prices, quality and safety standards and other regulatory requirements.
39 See “Relatório sobre Concorrência e Regulação no Transporte de Passageiros em Veículos 




40 Alessio di Amato, “Uber and the Sharing Economy”, 178.
41 Illinois Transportation Trade Association v City of  Chicago, Nos. 16-2009, 7 October, 2016.
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Differently, taxis are allowed to take on persons who hail them on the street, which 
means that an ordinance aimed at protecting passengers by screening the drivers and 
by imposing a uniform system of  rates is justified. 
The previous cases disclose two different views regarding the interchangeable 
nature of  the services provided by Uber and taxi drivers, which is pivotal to determine 
the relevant market for Competition law purposes. To these difficulties, one can add a 
further layer of  complexity. In fact, assuming that Uber provides a transport service, 
how should one conceive the activities developed by associated companies of  Uber 
who exploit numerous vehicles and employ several drivers to that effect? What is 
there to say about individual Uber drivers themselves, who may provide transport 
services on several platforms who are Uber’s competitors? Moreover, if  one accepts 
the AG’s idea that Uber created a new form of  supply which was not pre-existent, 
must companies such as the Portuguese Mytaxi  that allows users to book and order 
taxis through a mobile application – be considered as operating in a different market? 
What is ultimately the difference, from an economic and legal standpoint, between the 
activities pursued by all those involved in the provision of  transport services through 
electronic platforms?42 
III. Uber and regulation: technical rules and duty of prior 
notification
The preliminary reference made by the Lille court resulted in the judgment in 
Uber France,43 where the CJEU faced a variant of  the question decided in Elite Taxi. 
In this case, a French court had to decide on several offences allegedly committed 
by Uber France, notably (i) misleading commercial practices, (ii) the aiding and 
abetting of  the unlawful exercise of  the profession of  taxi driver, and (iii) the 
unlawful organization of  a system for putting customers in contact with persons 
carrying passengers by road for remuneration using vehicles with fewer than 10 seats. 
With regard to the latter offense, the national court was uncertain as to whether 
the provision included in the French Code of  Transports should be regarded as 
establishing a “rule on information society services” within the meaning of  Article 
1(5) of  Directive 98/34.44 In the affirmative, said provision would be subject to the 
duty of  prior notification to the European Commission before its adoption and 
the lack of  said notification meant that it could not be enforced against individuals. 
However, that would not be so if, on the contrary, the rule was to be considered as 
governing “services in the field of  transport” within the meaning of  Article 2(2)(d) 
of  Directive 2006/123. Hence, although from a different perspective, the question 
referred to the CJEU was not far from the one decided in Elite Taxi.
The provision of  national law at stake corresponded to Article L. 3124-13 of  
42 From an antitrust standpoint, several other questions can be explored in face of  the CJEU’s 
judgment in Elite Taxi. Scholars have questioned whether the Uber business model may entail a “hub 
and spoke” cartel, whether it involves illegal price fixing, and whether regulation can be achieved 
merely my applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
43 Judgment Uber France, 10 April 2018, case C-320/16.
44 Directive 98/34 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  22 June 1998 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of  information in the field of  technical standards and regulations was 
meanwhile ssuperseded by Directive 2015/1535 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  
9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of  information in the field of  technical 
regulations and of  rules on Information Society services.
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the Transport Code, which laid down criminal penalties for the organisation of  a 
system for putting customers in contact with persons carrying passengers by road for 
remuneration using vehicles with fewer than 10 seats, without being authorised to do so. 
Based on the precedent, the CJEU recalled that the intermediation service at issue was 
to be regarded as forming an integral part of  an overall service, the main component 
of  which was a transport service and, accordingly, had to be classified as a service in 
the field of  transport. In this light, insofar as the national court concluded that the 
intermediation service at stake did not essentially differ from the service in Elite Taxi, 
legislation that provided for criminal proceedings against a company rendering said 
intermediation service could not come within the scope of  Directive 2006/123.45 
It must be noted that in Uber France the Court mixed up the legal qualification of  
the service itself  with the classification of  the norm applicable to its provision. The 
AG carried out a finer analysis, considering that even if  the CJEU were to find that 
the UberPop service was an information society service, that would not affect the 
classification of  the provision of  the French law in question as a technical regulation. 
Indeed, not every provision that concerns, in one way or another, information 
society services automatically falls within the category of  technical regulations. In 
this context, although not ignoring that the prohibition at stake, it was principally 
directed at systems that connect two parties by electronic means and therefore, 
are aimed at information society services  even if  it could theoretically affect other 
categories of  intermediaries in the field of  transport, the AG highlighted that a 
rule on services is a requirement of  a general nature relating to the taking-up and 
pursuit of  service activities. Also, in order to be classified as a technical regulation, 
it is necessary that the specific aim and object of  such a requirement is to regulate 
such services in an explicit and targeted manner.46 By contrast, rules which affect 
such services only in an implicit or incidental manner are excluded from the duty 
of  notification. It was clear that the purpose of  the French provision was not to 
prohibit or to regulate the activity of  putting customers in touch with providers of  
transport services in general. It was solely to prohibit and to punish the activity of  
intermediary in the illegal exercise of  transport activities. Therefore, the activity of  
intermediary in legal transport services remains entirely outside the scope of  the 
provision. That being so, the provision affects information society services only in 
an incidental manner. According to the AG, the regulatory contribution made by the 
prohibition lies principally in the establishment of  criminal sanctions for participation 
in an activity which is already illegal under national legislation. These provisions are 
not and must not be subject to prior notification to the European Commission. An 
excessive notification obligation, with the penalty of  regulations that have not been 
notified being inapplicable, would facilitate circumvention of  the law and engender 
legal uncertainty, including in relationships between individuals.47
The contrast between the approaches of  the Court and of  the AG in Uber 
France can be tested with the Portuguese example. Indeed, it is unclear where to draw 
the line with regard to the duty of  notification in respect of  the recently adopted 
legislation governing individual transport in ordinary vehicles based on electronic 
platforms.48 The bill draws on a fundamental distinction between the types of  services 
45 Paras. 22-26 of  the judgment.
46 Para. 24 of  the AG’s Opinion.
47 Para. 31 of  the AG’s Opinion.
48 Law No. 45/2018, of  10th August. The new Act was the result of  hard and long negotiations with 
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provided by the new market players. On the one hand, it establishes the specific 
obligations applicable to the operators providing directly for transport services, 
foreseeing, for example, (i) qualification requirements for drivers; (ii) specific features 
and identification obligations applicable to vehicles; (iii) mandatory insurances; (iv) 
prohibition to take on passengers on the street and use bus lanes; (v) limitations 
on work hours, among others. On the other hand, the bill defines the conditions 
applicable to the companies providing for electronic platforms which organize and 
intermediate transportation services. In this respect, the bill includes rules governing 
not only access to the activity itself  but also imposing precise duties to provide 
information to customers with regard, notably, to the services, prices, maps, rating 
system, identification of  drivers and vehicles. The distinction between the legal 
regime applicable to the platforms and the one applicable to the drivers goes against 
the trend endorsed by the European case-law and may create paradoxical results. 
As a matter of  fact, it could be argued that although Uber should be considered as 
rendering transportation services, the rules governing its activity must be considered 
as information society rules for purposes of  prior notification to the European 
Commission. In fact, to borrow the AG’s words, the new set of  rules applicable to 
electronic platforms organizing transport services in Portugal clearly regulate the 
taking-up and pursuit of  such activities, having “the specific aim and object the regulation 
of  such services in an explicit and targeted manner”.49 
IV. Concluding remarks
Let us end with three brief  final remarks. First, to question whether the approach 
of  the CJEU in the Uber cases can be reconciled with the position of  the European 
Commission in the above-mentioned European Agenda for the Collaborative 
Economy. Indeed, the Commission has called upon States to take the opportunity 
created by the emergence of  new business models to simplify and modernize 
the conditions governing access to the market, loosening unnecessary regulatory 
constraints and avoiding market fragmentation. In contrast, by acknowledging the 
strictly national competence to regulate Uber (and alike) activities, the CJEU may 
have taken a step in the opposite direction. Emblematically, in Portugal, the national 
legislator seized the moment not to reform the taxi sector – as suggested also by the 
national Competition Authority50 – but to introduce a new sophisticated regulatory 
framework applicable to the companies and drivers rendering transport services 
based on electronic platforms. 
This approach contrasts also with the expansion of  Uber’s activities and the 
overwhelming reaction by consumers to the new opportunities created by the 
so-called sharing economy. There is a strong consumer movement supporting 
Uber, questioning the privileges of  incumbent taxi operators and demanding free 
competition. The fact that Uber has become an important source of  income for 
the stakeholders. It was drafted with the aim of  regulating services already available to consumers, but 
which are legally distinguished from taxi services. Contrary to ordinary vehicles, taxis are considered 
to address specific market failures and are therefore subject to public service obligations.
49 Para. 24 of  the AG’s Opinion in Judgment Uber France, 10 April 2018, case C-320/16.
50 The Portuguese Competition Authority highlighted the need to undertake a regulatory reform 
which should not, in any case, result in replicating the existing regulatory framework to new entrants 
but, on the contrary, in loosening current rules in order to ensure more competition and promote a 
broader supply range and higher quality of  services.
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the unemployed and that it represents an alternative to the purchase of  private cars 
is certainly not irrelevant. For what is worth, one must bear in mind that, in this 
context, consumer choices must not be underestimated. It is clear that the future of  
the sharing economy will largely depend on consumer behaviour. 
Secondly, to draw attention to the preliminary reference made by the German 
court in Uber BV,51 which leaves an important question open regarding Member 
State’s intervention in the field of  transport. Having also dwelled on the exact 
legal classification of  Uber activities, the Bundesgerichtshof  questioned the CJEU on 
whether it would be possible to justify a ban on Uber activities based on public order 
considerations. In this respect, it is worthwhile to remember that the CJEU has 
acknowledged a significant margin of  discretion to Member States when derogating 
from Treaties for public order reasons. More significantly, the question brings to the 
table, in a clearer fashion, the need to find the adequate balance between the Union 
and the States’ competences on transport issues. In this respect, one may wonder 
whether there is room under the Treaties for full harmonization in this field, and 
if  Articles 114 and 352 TFEU could be used as alternative or complementary legal 
basis to Article 91 TFEU.
Lastly, drawing on the previous points and going back to where I started, 
despite the anxieties and hesitations brought by the emergence of  new technologies, 
the debate surrounding the innovative models of  the sharing economy teaches us 
that, nine times out of  ten, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel. Much of  the 
legal questions put by the new realities are, in fact, old questions that have long been 
discussed in the context of  equally old inventions. This is not to say that all problems 
of  humankind have already been sorted out. It is, however, to acknowledge that, 
very often, the instruments necessary to deal with new phenomena are well-known. 
Thus, let us not forget that much of  the solutions the future demands are present in 
the formulas that have always governed human action, at least inasmuch we aim to 
construe a just, prosperous and harmonious society.
51 Judgment Uber BV, Case C-371/17, Removed from the register on 12 April 2018.
